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Abstract
We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments of
their abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from ap-
praisals of others and experience. Our model predicts that if communication
is imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive, and (ii) over-
confidence leading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidence
leading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model are consistent
with findings in the social psychological literature.
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1 Introduction
A person’s perception of his abilities may have substantial consequences for his
actions.1 If Shakespeare had had a low perception of his writing ability, perhaps
nobody would have known Hamlet. A young musician’s impression of her talent for
music may determine whether she decides to become a professional violinist. One
possible reason why women disproportionately avoid career in science is that they
underestimate their scientific reasoning ability (see Ehrlinger and Dunning, 2003).
Given that people’s assessments of their abilities are important for their choices, one
would expect that economists have paid much attention to the relationship between
people’s perceptions of their own abilities (self concepts) and people’s actual abilities
(the self). After all, isn’t economics pre-eminently the study of how people choose?
However, until very recently, research on this relationship has been done predomi-
nantly by social psychologists. Their research has resulted in "a large, fascinating,
yet sometimes confusing and contentious literature" (Sedikides and Strube, 1995, p.
1277). Baumeister (1998) gives a very interesting survey of this literature.
A high degree of consensus among social psychologists seems to exist on the
following three findings. First, people often misjudge their own abilities. For exam-
ple, College Board (1976-1977) reports small correlations between objective abilities
and persons’ perceptions of their own abilities for a wide range of domains (see
also Kruger, 1999). Of course, this finding is the raison d’être of the existence of a
voluminous literature on self-assessments. Second, although many individuals have
distorted self-concepts, people are neither generally overconfident nor generally un-
derconfident. It is well-known that for some dimensions a majority of people see
themselves better as average (famous examples are intelligence, attractiveness and
car driving). For other dimensions, a majority of people see themselves as worse
than average (music, art, mechanics, chess playing).2 Ackerman et al. (2002) report
experimental results suggesting that for broad items, say intelligence, people have
higher self-estimates of ability than for specific items, say being able to study long
hours (see also Klar et al., 1996). The third important finding of social psychologists
1Phillips (1984) shows a strong correlation between children’s subjective perceptions of their
abilities and their achievement behavior.
2Of course, the observation that a majority of people see themselves better (worse) than the
average does not imply the existence of overconfidence (underconfidence). It may also be the result
of a skewed distribution of abilities.
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is that accurate feedback on one’s ability is rare (see Jones and Wortman, 1973).
In particular, feedback tends to be too positive (Brown and Dutton, 1995; Felson,
1993). Own perceptions of abilities often do not resemble the way abilities are per-
ceived by others. On the other hand, in their survey of the early literature Shrauger
and Schoeneman (1979) conclude that own perceptions of abilities are closely related
to how people believe they are perceived by others.
In this paper we develop a simple model that yields predictions that are broadly
consistent with the three findings discussed above. Our model describes the inter-
action between a senior and her junior. The senior cares about her junior. She
knows the junior’s ability, but the junior does not know his own ability. In line with
the self-assessment theory in social psychology (Trope, 1979; Dunning, 1995; Taylor
et al., 1995), the junior wants to learn his ability to make better decisions in the
future. Specifically, the junior has to make decisions on two successive tasks. For
each task, the junior must choose between performing the task or not. Furthermore,
if the junior chooses to perform the task, he has to determine how much effort to
put in it. Effort and ability are complementary, in the sense that the higher is the
junior’s ability, the more effort he wants to put in a task. If the junior’s ability is
below a certain threshold, he should not perform the task at all. At the beginning
of the game, the senior sends a noisy message to the junior. Noisy in the sense that
with some probability the junior receives another message than the senior has sent.
Apart from learning about his ability through his senior’s message, the junior can
learn his ability by doing. Performing the first task yields information about his
ability which can be used when making a decision on the second task.
We derive the following results. First, the senior tends to deflate the ability of a
junior who is just able to perform a task. For such a junior, the cost of overconfidence
- too much effort - is higher than the cost of underconfidence - mistaken passiveness.
Second, the senior is inclined to inflate the ability of a talented junior. For a very able
junior, the cost of overconfidence is smaller than the cost of underconfidence. The
senior wants to avoid a situation that a talented junior abstains from performing
a task. She does so by exaggerating the junior’s ability. Third, we show that
on average the senior exaggerates a junior’s ability. The reason for this result is
that the cost of underconfidence (passiveness) is permanent, whereas the cost of
overconfidence (too much effort) is temporary because of learning by doing. This
3
last result is in line with Felson (1989) who observes that experience is a better
predictor of self- appraisals than appraisals of others.
Recently, several economic papers have appeared on the topic of judgement bi-
ases. Here we discuss some papers that focus on self-assessments of abilities. We
thereby ignore the literature that is concerned with questions like when and why
are people too certain about events or why are people overoptimistic about cer-
tain life-events (see Van den Steen, 2004). Why should economists be interested
in self-assessments of abilities in the first place? At the beginning of this introduc-
tion, we have already mentioned that people’s choices may depend on how they see
themselves. Fang and Moscarini (2005) nicely illustrate this point in the context of
a principal-agent problem. Assuming that effort and ability are complements, and
that agents overestimate their abilities, they show that performance evaluations may
reduce a firm’s profit. The reason is that through performance evaluations agents
may learn their actual abilities. Because agents on average overestimate their abili-
ties, learning may reduce average effort.
In Fang and Moscarini, overconfidence is assumed, not explained. Let us now
discuss economic studies that try to explain self-assessments. Two strands in this
literature can be distinguished. In the first, people form beliefs about their abili-
ties that are most useful to them. The benefit of a particular belief can be direct or
indirect. A direct benefit exists when a positive view of your abilities makes you hap-
pier. In the social psychological literature, this is referred to as the self-enhancement
approach to self-appraisals. Brunnermeier and Parker (2004) and Weinberg (2005)
show that the optimal belief depends on the direct benefit of a positive self view and
the cost of making incorrect decisions. In Hvide (2002), the benefit of a particular
belief is indirect. He shows that overconfidence strengthens the agent’s bargaining
power versus firms. In Bénabou and Tirole (2002) time inconsistent preferences are
the reason that people may want to forget information on their ability. Forgetting
negative information on your ability makes that you feel better now. The cost of
forgetting information is distorted future decision making. Time inconsistent pref-
erences may imply that the present benefit outweighs the future cost. By relying on
time-inconsistent preferences Bénabou and Tirole follow the self-enhancement ap-
proach. Concerning the supply of information on ability, Bénabou and Tirole focus
on communication between two selves, your current self, who possesses information,
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and the future self who may receive information. Because of the time-inconsistent
preferences, the two selves have conflicting preferences.
In the second strand of the literature, people learn their abilities. Zábojník
(2004) presents a model in which an agent can choose for receiving a signal about
his ability at the cost of foregone production. He shows that an agent keeps buying
signals until his self-assessment is sufficiently favourable (see also Brocas and Car-
rillo, 2002). Compte and Postlewaite (2004) assume that an agent’s confidence has
a direct effect on his performance. The agent’s confidence depends on his perception
of the frequency of past successes. Thus agents learn by doing. Our model belongs
to the second strand in the literature. The agent learns his ability from others and
may learn by doing.
A drawback of most of the studies mentioned above is that they only explain
overconfidence. It is true that many studies have reported a bias toward overconfi-
dence. However, one cannot deny that people exist who are plagued by self-doubt,
and hold unrealistically negative impressions of their abilities. This suggests that
self—enhancement cannot be the only explanation of self-assessments. More gener-
ally, we need a theory that can explain the existence of both overconfidence and
underconfidence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the model. Section 3 discusses an equilibrium of the model. Section 4 discusses the
consequences of relaxing two assumptions for our main results.
2 The Model
We consider a simple model of a senior (she) and a junior (he). The model consists
of three stages. The last two stages represent the junior’s future. In the first stage
the senior coaches the junior. In each of the last two stages, the junior must inde-
pendently make a binary decision, say, whether or not to perform some ambitious
task.
At the beginning of the game, the junior’s ability (the self), a, is drawn from a
distribution, f (a), on [0, 1]. The senior observes a, but the junior does not. The
junior only knows f (a). In stage 0, the senior tries to inform the junior about his
ability by sending a message m ∈ [0, 1]. Communication is not perfect. We model
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this as follows. Let r denote the message the junior receives. We assume that r
results from a continuous density function, gm (r) defined over [0, 1]. Moreover, we
assume that gm(r) > 0 and that it has one maximum, defined by g0m(r = m) = 0.
This assumption implies that small communication errors are more likely to occur
than large communication errors. Finally, we assume that gi (r = i) = gj (r = j).
This assumption ensures that in equilibrium E (a | r) is an increasing function of m.
Our way of modeling the communication between the senior and the junior tries
to capture the psychological model of the reflected appraisal process (see Kinch,
1963, and for a more recent discussion, Felson, 1993). This process consists of three
elements. The first element is self-appraisal. Self-appraisal refers to the way a person
views a certain feature of himself. Examples of features are academic ability, an
ability to perform a task, physical attractiveness and popularity. In our model, self-
appraisal is modeled as the junior’s equilibrium belief about his ability. The second
element is actual appraisals of others. In our model, this is denoted by m. The last
element is reflected appraisals, meaning a person’s perception of actual appraisals.
In our model, this is denoted by r. Empirical research by social psychologists shows
that there are only weak correlations between actual appraisals, m, and reflected
appraisals, r (Felson, 1993). We capture this by gm(r). Furthermore, experimental
research suggests that if reflected appraisals are taken into account, actual appraisals
do not explain self-appraisals (Schrauger and Schoeneman, 1979). In our model,
reflected appraisals lead to self-appraisals through Bayes’ rule.
As mentioned above, in stage t = 1 and stage t = 2, the junior chooses whether
or not to perform a task. In these stages, the junior works independently and cannot
rely on the senior anymore. The payoff of performing a task depends on the junior’s
ability and his effort, et > 0:
Ut (Xt = 1) = aet −
1
2
e2t (1)
Not performing a task Xt = 0 yields,
Ut (Xt = 0) = z > 0 (2)
The implication of z is that only if a exceeds a certain threshold, then the junior
should perform the task. Throughout, we assume that z < 1
2
, implying that juniors
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exist who should perform the task.
If the junior chooses X1 = 1 in stage 1, then he observes his payoff and con-
sequently infers a. If X1 = 0, then the junior does not obtain new information
about his ability. Our model thus allows for two ways of developing a self-concept:
appraisal (the senior’s message) and experience.
The senior cares about the junior. Her payoff is also given by (1) and (2). The
problem of both the senior and the junior is that the latter should perform the
task only if the task yields a payoff higher than z. This requires that the junior is
sufficiently able. Another problem is that in case the junior performs the task, he
must choose an effort level that accords with his ability.
Remark. In our model the senior provides information about the junior’s ability
by means of a simple message. For us, this simple message is a shortcut for something
much broader. For example, a message may reflect the way the senior coaches a
junior. A senior who gives the junior responsibilities may signal something else as a
senior who always assists her junior.
3 Equilibrium
Our game is a dynamic cheap-talk game. To solve the game, we apply the standard
Nash-Bayesian equilibrium concept, so that strategies are best responses to each
other, given beliefs, and beliefs follow from the strategies according to Bayes’ rule.3
3.1 Stage 2
Suppose that in stage 1 it is a best response of the junior to choose X1 = 1 with
e1 = aer = E (a | r) if r > r∗, and to choose X1 = 0 if r ≤ r∗. When analyzing the
second stage of the game, two cases have to be distinguished.
Case 1: X1 = 0
If it were optimal for the junior to choose X1 = 0 in stage 1, it is also optimal for
him to choose X2 = 0. To understand why, first recall that if X1 = 0, the junior
3It is well-known that in cheap-talk games a pooling equilibrium always exists (see Crawford
and Sobel, 1982). This is also true for our model. We ignore this pooling equilibrium.
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does not learn his ability. Learning requires that X1 = 1. As learning has not taken
place, the junior’s view on the project has not changed. Thus, there is an indirect
benefit of performing the task in stage 1. By choosingX1 = 1, the junior would have
learned his ability. This knowledge could be used when making a decision on X2.
The total expected benefit of X1 = 1 therefore exceeds the total expected benefit of
X2 = 1. Hence, if it were optimal for the junior to choose X1 = 0, it is optimal for
him to choose X2 = 0 too.
Case 2: X1 = 1
In this case, the junior has learned his ability. His decision on X2 is then relatively
easy. From (1) and (2) it is easy to see that if a junior opts for X2 = 1, he chooses
e2 = a. Moreover, X2 = 1 yields a higher payoff than X2 = 0 if 12a
2 > z or a >
√
2z.
Notice that ideally the senior wants the junior to act similarly in stage 1. The
senior knows the junior’s ability from the beginning, and the senior’s and junior’s
preferences are perfectly aligned. Consequently, if the senior’s message were without
any noise, r = m, then an equilibrium would exist in which the senior sends m =
a. This strategy would induce the junior to act in his own interest. For future
references, we would like to emphasize three features of the outcomes for the case that
r = m. First, the senior’s appraisal would not be biased. Second, underconfidence
(a > aer) or overconfidence (a < aer) would not exist. Finally, learning by experience
would not play a role. Performing the task in stage 1 would not deliver useful
information for the junior’s decision on the task in stage 2 in addition to the senior’s
message.
3.2 Stage 1
3.2.1 The Senior
For the moment we assume that in stage 1 it is a best response of the junior to
choose X1 = 1 with e1 = aer if r > r∗, and to choose X1 = 0 if r ≤ r∗. Furthermore
we assume that the junior’s beliefs imply that a higher value of m increases aer.
Let us begin by showing why truthfully revealing, that is always sending m = a,
cannot be part of an equilibrium. First suppose that a is low. We have already
established that if a ≤
√
2z, the junior should not perform the task. Therefore, for
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a ≤
√
2z, the senior should minimize the probability that her junior performs the
task. She does so by sending m = 0.
Now suppose that a is just above
√
2z. In that case, e1 = a would yield a
payoff to the junior that is slightly higher than z in both periods. However, as a
result of imperfect communication, it is unlikely that the junior actually chooses
e1 = a. In particular, overconfidence would result in e1 > a and consequently in
U1 (X = 1) < z. The implication is that for a just above
√
2z performing the task
is likely to yield a payoff below 2z. The more a deviates from
√
2z, the higher is the
expected payoff of performing the task and the lower is the cost of overconfidence.
More generally, a value of a = a∗ >
√
2z exists, for which the senior is indifferent
between sending m = 0 and sending m > 0.
Now consider high values of a. Let us start with a = 1. Clearly, in that case, the
senior has no incentive to sendm < 1. She wants the junior to perform the task with
e1 = 1. The best the senior can do is sending m = 1. Now suppose that a is slightly
below 1. Through the posterior beliefs, sending m < 1, in expectation, impels the
junior to choose a lower level of effort than sending m = 1. We now argue that also
in this case it is optimal for the senior to send m = 1. The reason is twofold. First,
by sending m = 1, the senior maximizes the probability that the junior performs
the task (Pr (r > r∗ | m) increases in m). Staying passive rather than performing
the task does not only affect the payoff in period 1. As learning by doing does not
take place when X1 = 0, period 2 payoff falls from 12a
2 to z. The benefit of sending
m = 1 instead of m < 1 is thus an increase in the probability that the junior learns.
The cost of sending m = 1 is a higher probability that the junior exerts too much
effort because of overconfidence (E (a | m = 1) > a). However, as a is close to 1,
both the probability of overconfidence and the cost of overconfidence are low. The
second reason why the senior may want to send m = 1 is that communication errors
are to some extent systematic. When a is close to 1, noise of communication is likely
to imply that aer < a. To compensate, the senior sends m = 1.
From the above discussion it follows that for high values of a, there are two
benefits of sending m = 1 rather than sending m < 1: first, it increases the prob-
ability of learning, and second, it may correct a systematic error. The magnitude
of these benefits increases in a. The cost of sending m = 1 is a higher probability
of overconfidence. This cost diminishes as a increases. More generally, there exists
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a value of a = a∗∗ for which the senior is indifferent between sending m = 1 and
sending m < 1.
So far, we have established three ranges of a: a ≤ a∗, a ≥ a∗∗ and a∗ < a < a∗∗.
For each of the first two ranges, the senior does not discriminate among types. For
a ≤ a∗, she sends m = 0, and for a ≥ a∗∗, she sends m = 1. For a∗ < a < a∗∗,
the senior neither wants to protect the junior fully against overconfidence nor wants
to protect the junior fully against passiveness. That is, the senior trades off the
costs of overconfidence and the costs of passiveness. Clearly, the higher is a, the
higher are the costs of passiveness, and the lower are the costs of overconfidence.
For a∗ < a < a∗∗, the senior’s strategy can now be characterized by m (a) with
m ∈ (0, 1) and m0 (a) > 0. For a’s just above a∗, m is smaller than a, whereas for
a’s just below a∗∗, m is larger than a.
3.2.2 The Junior
After the junior has received r, he forms a belief about a. Let the density function
hr (a) [with cumulative distribution Hr (a)] denote this belief. Asm0 (a) ≥ 0 and the
probability of large errors exceeds the probability of small errors, the expected value
of a, aer =
1Z
0
ahr (a) da, is an increasing function of r. It is now easy to characterize
the junior’s best response. First, suppose that X1 = 1. Then, (1) implies that the
junior chooses e1 = aer. Second, the junior chooses X1 = 1 if and only if r > r∗, with
r∗ solving
1
2
⎡
⎣
1Z
0
ahr∗ (a) da
⎤
⎦
2
+Hr∗
³√
2z
´
z +
h
1−Hr∗
³√
2z
´i
1Z
√
2z
1
2
a2hr∗ (a) da
1Z
√
2z
hr∗ (a) da
= 2z (3)
The first term of (3) simply denotes the expected period 1 payoff when e1 = aer.
The second and third term of (3) denote the expected period 2 payoff for a junior
who has exerted effort in period 1. Because the junior only exerts effort in period
2 if a >
√
2z, together the second and third term are larger than z. This reflects
learning by doing. The implication is that the junior chooses X1 = 1 even if the
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expected payoff for period 1 is lower than z. The difference between the first term
of (3) and z can be interpreted as the price the junior is willing to pay for learning
his ability.
Finally, we have to ensure that 0 ≤ r∗ ≤ 1. Two conditions must hold. First,
for r = 1, the left-hand side of (3) must be larger than 2z. Second, for r = 0,
the left-hand side of (3) must be smaller than 2z. These conditions require that
communication is not too noisy. In case communication is very noisy, it is optimal
for the junior not to rely on his senior when deciding on whether or not to perform
the task. For instance, if for r = 1, the left-hand side of (3) is lower than 2z,
the junior always abstains from performing the task. In that case, only a pooling
equilibrium exists. If for r = 0 the left-hand side of (3) is larger than 2z, then the
junior always performs the task. The senior’s message may affect the junior’s effort.
If an interior solution of r∗ exists, then the equilibrium is best characterized as a
semi-separating equilibrium. Some types of seniors choose the same action, while
other types of seniors choose different actions.
The discussion above can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose a value of r∗, 0 < r∗ < 1, for which (3) holds. An equi-
librium exists in which (i) the junior chooses X2 = 0 if X1 = 0 ∨ a <
√
2z, and
chooses X2 = 1 with e2 = a if X1 = 1 ∧ a ≥
√
2z; (ii) the junior chooses X1 = 1
with e1 =
1Z
0
ahr (a) da if r > r∗, and X1 = 0 if r ≤ r∗; (iii) the senior sends m = 0
if a ≤ a∗, m = 1 if a ≥ a∗∗, and 0 < m (a) < 1 with m0 (a) > 0 if a∗ < a < a∗∗, and
0 < a∗ ≤ a∗∗ < 1; and (iv) posterior beliefs, hr (a), result from the senior’s strategy
according to Bayes’ rule.
How does Proposition 1 relate to the psychological literature discussed in the
introduction? One finding by social psychologists was that people often misjudge
their own abilities. In our model, juniors may initially misjudge their abilities, but
in the end active juniors learn their abilities. The reason is that by performing a
task the junior becomes fully informed about his ability.4 Just after the juniors
have received the senior’s messages, they misjudge their abilities. In line with the
4If we relax this assumption (active juniors receive only a noisy signal), then juniors misjudge
their abilities also at the end of the game.
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second finding of the social psychological literature, then some juniors overestimate
their abilities, whereas others underestimate their abilities. Finally, our results are
consistent with the finding that appraisals by others are not accurate. To avoid
overconfidence, appraisals are sometimes too negative, but to avoid passiveness ap-
praisals can also be too positive. To produce more comparative-static results, we
consider an example in the next section.
4 An Example
Assume that a is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], that is f (a) = 1.
Moreover, assume that the senior can send three messages, m ∈ {l, n, h}, m = l,
meaning "low ability", m = n, meaning "normal ability", and m = h, meaning
"high ability". The junior receives r ∈ {l, n, h}. Because of noise of communication
r may deviate from m. As to this noise, we assume:
Assumption 1 Pr(r = l | m = l) = Pr(r = n | m = n) = Pr(r = h | m = h) = α
Assumption 2 Pr(r = n | m = l) = Pr(r = n | m = h) = 1− α
Assumption 3 Pr(r = l | m = n) = Pr(r = h | m = n) = 1
2
(1− α)
Assumption 4 α > 1
2
.
Assumption 1 states that the probability that the junior receives the correct message
equals α, and that this probability is independent of m. Assumption 2 and 3 imply
that small communication errors are more likely than large ones. Notice that by
sending m = l (m = h), the senior can avoid that the junior receives r = h (r = l).5
The assumption that α > 1
2
implies that the probability that r = m, is higher than
the probability that r 6= m. This assumption ensures that if the senior wants the
junior to receive message r = i the best she can do is sending message m = i.
Finally, we simplify the model of the previous section by restricting the choice of
effort to three alternatives, et ∈
©
0, 1
2
, 1
ª
. As before, et = 0 amounts to maintaining
5We have set Pr(r = h | m = l) = Pr(r = l | m = h) at zero rather than at small positive values
to reduce notation. What matters for the results is that by choosing m = h (m = l), the senior
minimizes the probability that the junior receives r = l (r = h).
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status quo, and learning requires et > 0. As in the present model the junior cannot
learn his ability by exerting an infinitesimal level of effort, we can assume that z = 0.
Let us now discuss the equilibrium for this example.
4.1 Stage 2
Suppose that in stage 1 it is a best response of the junior to act in line with the
message he has received: choose X1 = 0 if r = l, X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 if r = n, and
X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 if r = h. Suppose X1 = 0. Then, as in the general model,
it is also optimal for the junior to choose X2 = 0. Now suppose X1 = 1, implying
that the junior learns his ability. His decision then depends on the answer to the
question: for which values of a should the junior choose X2 = 0, X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 ,
or X2 = 1 with e2 = 1? Let aL denote the value of a for which the junior, knowing
a, is indifferent between X2 = 0 and X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 . aL follows from [see (1)
and (2) with z = 0]
1
2
a− 1
8
= 0⇒ a = aL =
1
4
(4)
Furthermore, let aH denote the value of a for which the junior, knowing a, is indif-
ferent between X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 and X2 = 1 with e2 = 1. aH follows from
1
2
a− 1
8
= a− 1
2
⇒ a = aH =
3
4
(5)
Equations (4-5) imply that in stage 2 all three options may be optimal for the junior.
For a ∈ [0, 1
4
], the junior chooses X2 = 0; for a ∈ (14 ,
3
4
), the junior chooses X2 = 1
with e2 = 12 ; and for a ∈ [
3
4
, 1], the junior chooses X2 = 1 with e2 = 1.
4.2 The Senior
Generally, the senior wants the junior to choose X1 = 0 for low values of a, to
choose X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 for intermediate values of a, and to choose X1 = 1 with
e1 = 1 for high values of a. Against this background, it is natural to assume that
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the senior’s strategy can be represented by:
m (a) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
m = l if a ≤ a∗
m = n if a∗ ≤ a < a∗∗
m = h if a ≥ a∗∗
(6)
Let us first establish that α < 1 has consequences for the senior’s strategy.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the junior chooses X1 = 0 if r = l, X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 if
r = n, and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 if r = h. Then, aL < a∗ and a∗∗ < aH.
Proof. Suppose that a = aL. Then, for α = 1, both players are indifferent between
X1 = 0 and X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 . Clearly, X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 yields a lower payoff.
The inequality α < 1 implies that m = n may impel the junior to choose X1 = 1
with e1 = 1. Sending m = l, by contrast, never leads the junior to choose X1 = 1
with e1 = 1. Hence, the senior strictly prefers sending m = l to sending m = n.
Now suppose that a = aH . Then, both players are indifferent between X1 = 1 with
e1 = 12 and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1, while X1 = 0 yields a lower payoff. By sending
m = h, the senior can avoid that the junior chooses the inferior option X1 = 0.
Hence, the senior strictly prefers sending m = h to sending m = n. Q.E.D.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 1, first consider a junior whose ability
is just above aL. In this situation, the senior ideally wants the junior to perform the
task with moderate effort. However, the senior really wants to prevent the junior to
exert too much effort. The costs of overconfidence are much higher than the costs
of underconfidence. To avoid overconfidence, and in turn e1 = 1, the senior sends
r = l. Now consider a junior whose ability is just below aH . In that situation, the
worst case is that the junior chooses not to perform the task. Then, the benefits
of the project in period 1 are foregone, and the junior will not learn his ability.
Clearly, the cost of underconfidence are now higher than the costs of overconfidence.
By sending m = h the senior is sure to avoid a situation in which the junior chooses
not to perform the task.
Let us now determine the equilibrium values of a∗ and a∗∗. For a = a∗, the
senior is indifferent between sending m = l and sending m = n. Suppose that the
senior sends m = l. Then, with probability α, the junior receives r = l and does
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not perform the task. With probability 1−α, the junior receives r = n and chooses
X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 . In that case, the junior learns that a = a
∗ > aL, implying that
he will also choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 in stage 2. Thus, m = l yields an expected
payoff to the junior equal to
2 (1− α)
µ
1
2
a∗ − 1
8
¶
(7)
Now suppose that the senior sendsm = n. Then, with probability 1
2
(1−α) the junior
receives r = l and does not perform the task. With probability α the junior receives
r = n, and performs the task with e1 = 12 . Finally, with probability
1
2
(1− α), the
junior performs the task with effort e1 = 1. In the latter two cases, the junior learns
that a = aL, leading him to choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 in stage 2. Sending m = n
yields an expected payoff to the junior equal to
3
4
a∗ +
1
4
αa∗ − 5
16
+
1
16
α (8)
It is easy to verify that (7) equals (8) for
a∗ =
1 + 3α
20α− 4 (9)
Equation (9) illustrates the tradeoff the senior faces when she must choose between
sending m = l and sending m = n. On the one hand, she knows that the junior
is (just) sufficiently able to perform the task when a = a∗. Therefore, the more
confident the senior is that m = n induces the junior to choose X1 = 1 with e = 12
(that is the higher is α), the more she tends to send m = n. On the other hand, the
senior fears that by sending m = n the junior will put too much effort on the task.
For a = a∗∗, the senior is indifferent between sending m = h and sending m = n.
Lemma 1 states that for a = a∗∗, a junior, knowing his ability, chooses to perform
the task with moderate effort. Thus, if the junior chooses X1 = 1 in stage 1, he will
choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 in stage 2. Consequently, sending m = n yields a payoff
equal to (8) with a∗∗ instead of a∗. Moreover, straightforward algebra shows that
sending m = h yields a payoff to both the senior and the junior equal to
a∗∗ +
1
2
αa∗∗ − 1
4
− 3
8
α (10)
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Equation (8), with a∗ replaced by a∗∗, equals (10) for
a∗∗ =
7α− 1
4 (1 + α)
(11)
Equation (11) shows that the lower is α, the more the senior is inclined to send
m = h. In deciding to send m = h or m = n, the senior compares two costs. First,
the costs of underconfidence. By sending m = n, the senior runs the risk that the
junior receives r = l and consequently does not perform the task in stage 1. In that
case, the junior does not learn her ability and will not perform the task in stage
2 either. Second, the costs of overconfidence. By sending m = h the junior will
expend too much effort (recall a∗∗ < aH = 34). Notice that this cost is limited to
stage 1. As learning by doing takes place, the junior will choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12
in stage 2.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the junior chooses X1 = 0 if r = l, X1 = 1 with
e1 = 12 if r = n, and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 if r = h. Then, the senior sends m = l if
a ≤ 1+3α
20α−4 , m = h if a ≥
7α−1
4(1+α) and m = n otherwise.
A direct implication of the above proposition is that if α = 1
2
, then the senior never
sends m = n.
4.3 Evaluation of the Example
Let us now go back to the social psychologists’ findings on self-assessments discussed
in the introduction. Data on self-assessments are usually based on experiments. In
these experiments, persons - often undergraduates - are asked to rate a certain skill
on some scale. Researchers use different scales. For example, Kruger (1999) uses a
scale from 1 to 10, while Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003) use a 3-point scale in one of
their experiments. How would juniors from our model rate themselves?
In our example 25 percent of the juniors should not perform the task; 50 percent
should perform the task with moderate effort; and 25 percent should perform the
task with high effort. Suppose that the juniors are asked to rate their abilities in
stage 1, that is, after they have received message r. In line with the senior’s message
space we assume a 3-point scale: low ability, normal ability, and high ability. It seems
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natural to assume that when asked to their ability, the juniors from our model report
the message they have received from their senior. This means that if α = 1, abilities
and self-assessments do not differ (see Figure 1)
25%
50%
25%
low ability normal ability high ability
Figure 1
Now suppose that α = 0.7. With the help of Proposition 2, it is easy to calculate
the frequencies with which the senior sends the three possible messages. Figure 2
gives the distribution of m.
31%
26%
43%
low ability normal ability high ability
Figure 2
Using Assumption (1-3) and the percentages given in Figure 2, we can calculate
the messages the juniors receive and thus their self-assessments. Figure 3 gives the
results.
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26%
40%
34%
low ability normal ability high ability
Figure 3
A comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 3 shows that the tails in Figure 3
are much thicker than in Figure 1. Almost 35 percent of the juniors report that
they have a high ability, while only 25 percent of the juniors actually have a high
ability. Another feature of Figure 3 is that the distribution of self-assessments
is skewed to the right. It is tempting to conclude from this skewness that our
model predicts inflated self-assessments. As the distribution of actual abilities is
symmetric, there is an "above average effect". However, as long as the juniors make
correct statistical inferences, overconfidence (or underconfidence) does not exist on
average. To understand why, consider a junior who has received r = h. If rational,
this junior takes into account that (1) the senior may have sent m = n or m = h;
and (2) the senior has sent a message in line with the values of a∗ and a∗∗ reported
in Proposition 1. In that case, the junior does not make a systematic error when
assessing his ability.
While juniors do not necessarily make systematic errors on self-assessments, they
do make systematic errors on the choice of task. In our model overconfidence induces
juniors to put too much effort in the task. Underconfidence induces juniors to remain
passive, while they would have benefited from performing the task. Misperceptions
of abilities are partly caused by noise in the communication (α < 1). For example,
a moderately talented junior may abstain from performing a task because he mis-
takenly infers from his senior’s message that he is untalented. More interesting are
the cases in which the junior’s misperception is "intended by the senior". We have
seen that when a ∈ [a∗∗, aH), the senior sends a message which is likely to induce a
junior to expend too much effort on the task. Such a junior is overconfident. No-
18
tice that overconfidence is temporary. Because the junior performs the task, he will
learn his ability. This feature of the model is consistent with the observation that
"performance is a better predictor of self-appraisals than the appraisals of others"
(Felson, 1989, p. 965). When a ∈ (aL, a∗] the senior is likely to induce a junior
who would benefit from performing the task to abstain from performing the task.
In that case, the junior is underconfident. As for a ∈ (aL, a∗] underconfidence leads
to passiveness, underconfidence is permanent. Also notice that because underconfi-
dence leads to passiveness and overconfidence leads to activism, underconfidence is
relatively hidden. It is easier to observe that somebody has overestimated his ability
than that somebody has underestimated his ability.
In Figure 2, the distribution of the senior’s messages is skewed to the right. To
show that this result does not depend on the specific value of α chosen, we compare
the length of the interval (aL, a∗] with the length of the interval [a∗∗, aH). Straight-
forward algebra shows that aH−a∗∗ = (1−α)1+α > a∗−aL =
1−α
10α−2 for
1
2
≤ α < 1. Hence,
consistent with the empirical findings, our model predicts that on average appraisals
are too positive. The reason for this result is that the costs of causing overconfi-
dence (too much effort) are lower than the costs of underconfidence (passiveness).
As discussed above, overconfidence disappears in stage 2, but underconfidence does
not disappear in stage 2. Indeed, one can verify that if we eliminate stage 2 from
our model, then we obtain aH − a∗∗ = 14α −
1
4
= a∗ − aL.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a simple model of self-assessments in order to explain some
observations made by social psychologists. In this model, a junior has limited in-
formation about his ability. He can learn about his ability by information provided
by a senior and by experience. We have shown that when communication between
the senior and the junior is noisy, the senior may have an incentive to give too
positive appraisals to more talented juniors and too negative appraisals to less tal-
ented juniors. On average, the senior’s appraisals are too positive. Concerning
self-assessments, our model predicts the well-known "above average effect": the dis-
tribution of self-assessments is skewed to the right, while the distribution of actual
abilities is symmetric. Nevertheless, in our model some juniors believe they are less
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able than they actually are. In this respect, our model deviates from most other
economic models of self-assessments that predict that all agents are overconfident
(references are in the introduction). Finally, we have argued that when overcon-
fidence or underconfidence matters for behaviour, there is an important difference
between the two. Underconfidence leads to passiveness, which obstructs learning by
experience. In contrast, overconfidence leads to activism, which enhances learning
by experience. The implication is that underconfidence is more permanent, while
overconfidence is more temporary.
In order to highlight the role of imperfect communication and the possibility
of learning by doing in the self-appraisal process, we have made several restrictive
assumptions. We have already discussed some of them. Let us elaborate on two
other ones.
First, we have assumed that by performing the task, the junior fully learns his
ability. In many situations, this assumption is not realistic. However, assuming that
by performing the task the junior receives a noisy signal about his ability rather
than a fully informative signal does not affect our results qualitatively. Relative to
underconfidence, overconfidence remains a temporary phenomenon. Things become
more complicated when the degree of learning depends on effort. One can imagine
situations in which the degree of learning is positively related to effort. In that case,
the junior will be more biased towards performing the task with higher effort.
A second important assumption is that the junior’s and senior’s preferences
are perfectly aligned. A natural extension of our model is to allow for conflict-
ing preferences. Suppose, for example, that the senior’s preferences are identical
to those of the junior, except that the senior attaches less cost to the junior’s ef-
fort: Umt (Xt = 1) = aet − λme2t , with λm < 12 . The junior’s preferences are still
represented by (1). It is easy to verify that in the resulting model, three types of
equilibria exist. A separating equilibrium exists if λm is close to 12 . The outcomes
are similar to those discussed in the previous section, save that the senior has a
stronger incentive to exaggerate her junior’s ability. Thus, λm < 12 strengthens the
senior’s tendency towards too positive feedback. If λm is smaller than a certain
threshold, it is not a best reply for the junior anymore to act in accordance with his
senior’s message. The senior inflates the junior’s ability too much. For moderate
values of λm a partially separating equilibrium exists, in which the senior only sends
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two messages, say m = n and m = h. Finally, for very small values of λm, it is a
best response for the junior to ignore the senior’s message completely, and to base
his decision on the task on his prior information. That is, only a pooling equilibrium
exists. The upshot of this discussion is that λm < 12 increases the senior’s incentive
to give too positive feedback. This stronger incentive may partially or fully distort
communication between the senior and the junior.
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